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ABSTRACT PAGE
This thesis is concerned with the “Glorious” English Revolution (1688-89) and 
the American Revolution (1776-83) and the propaganda of each movement. It discusses 
the early portions of each revolution and the initial propagandistic strategies employed by 
its revolutionaries and applies a comparative approach. In particular, it focuses upon the 
leaders and figureheads of each revolution and their role in the propaganda campaigns 
that sought to legitimize their revolts. One prominent individual from each movement 
and one important event which the individuals participated in form the crux of the study. 
These individuals and events were chosen for the rough correlation they share to one 
another in placement and importance in their revolutions. For the Glorious Revolution, I 
have considered William III and his landing at Torbay in November 1688, while for the 
American Revolution I have considered George Washington and his entrance into 
Cambridge, Massachusetts in July 1775.
The goal of this essay is to explore how both William and Washington, and those 
who supported them, attempted to legitimize themselves in the periods immediately 
preceding and following these events. It thoroughly examines various forms of 
revolutionary propaganda including declarations, pamphlets, sermons, petitions, letters, 
and public speeches. In so doing it exposes many intriguing similarities and differences 
between William, Washington, and their use o f propaganda which I believe speak to the 
larger similarities and differences in general between these two revolutions. Ultimately, 
my thesis argues that both Washington and William not only supported the propaganda 
campaigns of their revolutions but in some cases personally crafted persuasive documents 
for public consumption. It concludes that these actions greatly helped the revolutionaries 
legitimize themselves and contributed to the somewhat inaccurate understandings of 
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I. Introduction
Traditionally, revolution has been used to attempt to bring about fundamental 
changes in political structures, usually in response to some form of social or political 
breakdown. These attempts at change have been met with both positive and negative, 
violent and relatively peaceful, results. Often the success or failure of a revolutionary 
movement is dependent upon winning the support of the populace. If a considerable 
number of “the people” do not support the revolutionaries and their arguments for the 
necessity of change, it will be very difficult for any new government to legitimize itself 
and gain long term stability, and the revolutionaries will most likely fail. In order to 
influence the beliefs of the populace, the ideas of the revolutionaries must be clearly and 
effectively stated in some form and then presented to the people so that the message of 
the revolution can be properly disseminated. Without the successful spread of a 
revolutionary ideology the people will most likely be distrustful of change and will 
oppose or remain ambivalent to it. Thus, the key to the successful transformation of the 
organizational or power structures of a government in a revolution is the achievement of 
‘legitimization through the effective use of persuasion or, as it is more often called, 
propaganda.
Propaganda has recently been defined as “the deliberate, systematic attempt to 
shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that 
furthers the desired intent of the propagandist.”1 It has been used by legitimate 
governments and revolutionary powers alike as a way to influence public opinion, often
1 Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 
1999), 269.
2through the “reinforcement of cultural myths and stereotypes.”2 Often these myths are so 
deeply engrained within a society and their effectiveness so widespread that the 
identification of a message as a propagandistic one can be difficult.
With these points in mind, there are many questions about the nature of 
propaganda and legitimization in revolution. Why exactly do some revolutions, even 
those armed with the most persuasive arguments for change, fail while others succeed? 
What particular forms of argumentation have proven to be the most effective in 
revolutions? Are all forms of political persuasion in revolution to be considered 
propaganda? Do different types of revolutionaries, fighting for very different things, 
attempt to legitimize themselves with the same kind of propaganda? In what way does the 
propaganda of legitimization change as the circumstances of the revolution itself change?
It is with these questions in mind that this essay will attempt to further understand 
the issues of propaganda and legitimization in revolution by examining and comparing a 
pair of specific historical moments from two revolutionary movements. The two 
revolutions I will examine are the “Glorious” English Revolution (1688-89) and the 
American Revolution (1776-83). The two moments from these revolutions that I will 
study are, respectively, the periods immediately preceding and following the landing of 
William of Orange at Torbay in November 1688 and the arrival of General George 
Washington in Cambridge, Massachusetts in July 1775.
I have chosen these two particular revolutions because of the unique similarities 
and differences that they exhibit. Both the Glorious Revolution and the American 
Revolution are popularly remembered today with a certain rosy-minded admiration. An 
extraordinary sense of national pride seems to be connected to these movements, lending
2 Ibid.
3them an almost mythical status. This allows many people to look beyond the complicated 
and sometimes chaotic elements of the events in order to see only clear-cut and 
reaffirming examples of the ostensible “greatness” of the American and British political 
experiments.
Additionally, both movements stand apart as somewhat unusual examples of 
revolution. Following the original early modem understanding of the term, these 
“revolutions” were labeled as such because they represented a “return” to older principles 
rather than a radical “rebirth” featuring new ideas. As a result, in comparison to the far 
more radical and explosive sociopolitical experiments of the Russian (1917) or Chinese 
(1946-49) Revolutions, these movements appear far more conservative. In many ways, 
the Glorious Revolution was not very “revolutionary,” in so far as those with power and 
influence in English society (the elite landowners and the mling dynasty itself) remained 
in power. While there may have been a new person (or in this case new persons) on the 
throne there were no fundamental economic or social changes that accompanied the 
movement.3 And while the American Revolution certainly had its share of “radical” 
moments, it was also nevertheless largely devoid of the kinds of chaos exhibited by other 
revolutionary movements. No kings were publicly executed, the governmental structure 
of the colonies did not break down into disorder or anarchy, and the economic conditions, 
while hardly prosperous, remained relatively stable. I believe these distinctive features 
encourage further comparison between the revolutions.
To be fair, however, there are many differences between these two revolutions. 
They are separated by more than a hundred years and took place in very different
3 Dale Hoak, The World o f  William and Mary: Anglo-Dutch Perspectives on the Revolution o f  1688-89 
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1996), 12.
4political climates, for strikingly different reasons and with very different results. These 
differences may complicate a comparison of these movements, especially if one were to 
consider both revolutions in their entirety. As a result, for the purposes of this essay, I 
have made the decision to limit my study to two particular portions of the revolutions, or 
more precisely, to the actions of two influential individuals during two periods of great 
risk and uncertainty. I believe these figures and events that I have chosen roughly 
correlate to one another in terms of their relative importance and their general placement 
in the revolutions and are thus worthy of comparison.
Both William’s landing at Torbay and Washington’s entrance into Cambridge 
stand apart as crucial turning points that occurred fairly early on in the movements. Both 
William and Washington had been placed in precarious situations from which they no 
longer had the power to extricate themselves. Both had now committed themselves to 
their revolutions and were indelibly linked with them so much so that the failure of the 
revolution would have resulted in the destruction of the leaders. It is also important to 
note that at the time of these events, both Washington and William lacked any formal, 
legal justification for their actions. While William was formally “invited” by a group of 
English nobles to invade and did have an outside claim to the throne, his actions were 
effectively a coup d ’etat: a forceful seizure of power from a legitimate monarch. The 
Prince of Orange still needed to convince a large segment of the English population, 
common and noble alike, of the purity and justification of his actions both before and 
after Torbay. Washington, while formally appointed Commander-in-chief by the 
Continental Congress and held in very high esteem by many patriots, was technically a 
rebellious commander of a rogue army. By July of 1775, the colonies were effectively in
rebellion, with blood having already been spilt at the Battles of Lexington, Concord, and 
Bunker Hill, while the Continental Congress (the only source of Washington’s legal 
legitimacy) was not yet recognized as a genuine governmental body by anyone outside 
the colonies. The Americans had not even declared their independence and were quite far 
from obtaining any kind of real unity.
Additionally, I believe Washington and William themselves are worthy of 
comparison. Both were strong military and political leaders, the heroes and figureheads 
of their movements, responsible for leading their forces to victory against great odds and 
under intense pressure. Both were first and foremost soldiers. William had been fighting 
in Europe against the forces of Louis XIV for all of his adult life and considered his 
actions in England to be another part of his great war against the spread of Catholic 
absolutism. Washington, a veteran of the Seven Years War, had been professionally 
trained by the British army and was able to secure his commission as commander-in- 
chief in large part because of his extensive military background.
Furthermore, both men actively generated propaganda in order to support their 
actions. William pursued a series of aggressive propaganda campaigns in order not only 
to make the case to his own people of the immediate need for an invasion of England but 
also to the English people before and after his landing. This campaign included the 
extensive use of declarations and pamphlets as well as politically charged sermons 
delivered by those loyal to his efforts such as Gilbert Burnet. Washington played a 
similar game, participating in a well-crafted propaganda campaign with the Continental 
Congress in order to gain support for their young cause. This included the creation of 
several declarations and other mass produced and direct appeals to the populace.
6Additionally, Washington’s personal letters, his general use of language, and the nature 
of his arguments for American Independence suggest that he was at least somewhat 
complicit in the great war of words which ensued among Patriots and Loyalists in the 
colonies.
A discussion of these matters, however, also invites a discussion of the role 
played by the larger bodies of government which were irrevocably tied to these two 
revolutionaries throughout their struggles. After all, no one person can legitimize a 
revolution single-handedly. A propaganda campaign, especially during a revolution, is a 
concerted effort on the part of many individuals and while the great leaders or hero 
figures may assume the spotlight in such a campaign, they are not the only ones 
responsible for the dissemination of a revolutionary ideology. William of Orange and 
George Washington would have been powerless to enact real change in their revolutions 
were it not for the support of the British parliament and the American Continental 
Congress. Thus these bodies of government must also be considered part of our 
discussion.
In summary, the goal of this essay will be to compare these revolutions and the 
revolutionaries who were able to legitimize themselves during them. Specifically, it will 
explore how the propagandistic tactics used by both William and Washington, and the 
larger bodies of government supporting them, attempted to legitimize themselves in the 
periods immediately preceding and following two important sets of events. My focus will 
be upon the various forms of propaganda employed by American and English 
revolutionaries, including official declarations, pamphlets, and sermons as well as 
personal letters and other correspondence. With an eye for the explicit language using by
7the propagandists, I will compare the arguments William, Washington, and those around 
them used to support themselves. Thematically, I will look for similar concepts which run 
through the propaganda of each revolution including religion, natural rights and the 
rejection of absolutism, appealing to the masses (through both the spoken and the printed 
word), the use o f military force, and the use of direct, personal attacks. In the end, I 
believe the similarities and differences between the two events will speak to the larger, 
general similarities and differences between the two revolutions.
8II. The Build-up to Revolution
The events leading up to the Glorious and American Revolutions, and the role
played by George Washington and William of Orange in them, are complicated and
require a brief but thorough introduction in order to be properly understood. This section
will provide that introduction before a more detailed discussion of the propaganda
surrounding Washington, William, Cambridge, and Torbay follows.
* *  *
The causes and effects of the Glorious Revolution and William Ill’s place in it 
must be understood within their proper European context. The events of 1688 and 1689 
were as much a Dutch as an English affair and the influence of other forces from the 
continent cannot be ignored.4
In the years before the invasion, the Prince of Orange pursued an aggressive 
foreign policy of opposition to and containment of the great menace of late seventeenth- 
century Europe: Louis XIV of France. As a stadholder and an influential member of one 
of the most powerful families in the Seven Provinces, William engaged in a series of 
conflicts (namely the Franco-Dutch War) with the French king and his allies throughout 
the 1670’s and 1680’s. The purpose of these wars was to stem the territorial and thereby 
the religious expansion of Catholic France into the Protestant Netherlands. While 
William was largely successful in these respects, forcing the French to withdraw from 
most of Dutch territory, Louis nevertheless made other considerable gains in the region 
while forcing the Dutch to exhaust a great deal of their money and resources in the
4 Ibid.
9process. Despite various periods of peace and attempts at reconciliation between the 
warring powers, such as the Treaty of Nijmegen of 1678, William remained firmly 
convinced of Louis’ desire to conquer the whole of Europe and rule it as an absolute 
Catholic monarch.5 In an ever precarious diplomatic position, the prince thus engaged in 
a series of political maneuvers, in anticipation of further conflict, in order to strengthen 
his ability to defy the French. The most important of these maneuvers involved England 
which William, contrary to the opinions of many in the Dutch political community, 
would come to believe possessed.a vital and, as of yet, unexploited military potential.6
By marrying into the English royal family and increasing his visibility among the 
English people, the Prince of Orange began to become more familiar with the country’s 
internal politics. This familiarity, in time, enabled William to assert himself as a popular, 
potential successor to the embattled Charles II and later James II. Despite this, however, 
the prince’s life goal was never to become the king of England.7 Desiring “a change in 
policy, not a change in monarch,” the prince saw the throne as a means to an end more 
than it was anything else; a tool with which he planned to bring England, with its
o
powerful army and navy, into an anti-French alliance. It was only later, after James’ 
attempted flight and the outbreak of near chaotic mob violence in London and other 
cities, that William would decide that a deliberate seizure of the throne was the best way 
to ensure that his objectives were met.9 While the subsequent Whig historiography paints 
William as the consummate “Protestant deliverer” and praises his efforts to save England
5 John Miller, The Glorious Revolution (London; New York: Longman, 1983), 11.
6 Hoak, 23.
7 Ibid., 21.
8 Robert Beddard, “The Unexpected Whig Revolution o f 1688” in The Revolutions o f 1688: The Andrew 
Browning Lectures, 1988, ed. Robert Beddard, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 13.
9 Ibid., 14.
10
from “popery and arbitrary power” the prince was primarily motivated to invade and 
indeed conquer James’ throne by strategic considerations.10 While religion was indeed a 
vital issue, William’s dynastic interests in England, advanced by his marriage and 
political maneuvering, must be understood as part of his so-called “grand strategy” to 
contain Louis XIV.
As William maneuvered, the political situation in England grew increasingly 
tumultuous. Rising to the throne in February 1685, King James II, almost immediately 
began alienating a great number of his people. Criticized by Whig and Tory alike for its 
absolutism and “popery” James’ regime was widely unpopular but remained very far 
from collapse.11 It was clear to many that without outside assistance there would be little 
chance of removing the king from power. Despite these developments William still 
lacked both the appropriate opportunity as well as the support to effectively implement 
his ambitious plans for England. This began to change, however, beginning in the early 
1680’s as a result of a number of complicated and intertwined events.
In 1682, Louis once again renewed his hostilities by attacking the Spanish 
Netherlands, placing the neighboring Dutch province of Holland in jeopardy. Three years 
later, as part of his larger crusade against Protestants in his own country, the French king 
revoked the Edict of Nantes, which for nearly a hundred years had guaranteed religious 
toleration to all Huguenots. This bold move, which sent shockwaves throughout all the
courts of Europe, also resulted in an unprecedented flight of wealthy French protestants,
12leaving France robbed of a great deal of potential capital and economic expertise. To 




which he had earlier placed upon imports from the Dutch Republic up until the Treaty of 
Nijmegen. This action in turn set off a Franco-Dutch commercial war, once again 
arousing fears within the Seven Provinces of further French military action in the 
Netherlands. On the heels of these developments, word arrived in December of that year 
that Mary of Modena, James IT s queen, was pregnant with their first child. Many at 
James’ court optimistically announced that Mary would soon give birth to a son who 
would be raised a Catholic and come to surpass William in the line of succession.
This series of chance events, arriving in relatively quick succession, convinced 
William and his fellow Burgomasters that swift and direct action was needed. 
Successfully playing upon the increased fears of his countrymen William secured 
unprecedented support for his bold “grand strategy.” Armed with this new mandate, the 
prince engaged in a bold propaganda campaign with the goal of legitimizing his plans to 
invade England and gain control of its government.
While the Glorious Revolution must be seen as a distinctly European conflict, the 
American Revolution must be appreciated as a transatlantic event, fought principally 
between two increasingly different parts of a large and unwieldy colonial empire. The 
revolution undoubtedly had its European elements. Continental powers, especially the 
French, had a vested interest in the revolution and ultimately gave their support to the 
colonial cause in order to subvert the imperial efforts of their rivals. In addition, the 
British, because of concerns of a Bourbon Alliance invasion of their homeland and the 
defense of their interests in the West Indies, were never able to concentrate all of their 
resources on the conflict. Nevertheless, at its core, the revolution was an internal struggle
12
between two groups of English subjects with differing opinions as to the nature of 
sovereignty with regards to a particular portion of British territory. Thus, despite its 
European aspects, the American Revolution must be understood as more of an internal 
British-colonial or “American” event than anything else.
Following its victory in the Seven Years War (1754-1763), Great Britain chose to 
drastically redefine its relationship with its American colonies. Motivated in part by the 
massive debt incurred from the war and the daunting cost of maintaining permanent 
garrisons in North America in order to combat French, Spanish, or Native American 
incursions, government ministers adopted a decidedly more “imperial” posture. As a 
result, the mother country began exercising a more centralized form of administrative 
control over its dependencies than ever before.13
With a series of new tax initiatives, beginning with the Sugar Act (1764) and the 
Stamp Act (1765), the British government sought to increase both its direct revenue from 
and its influence in the colonies. These taxes were met with a great deal of resistance by 
many colonials. Before these acts there had been no direct interference by the British 
Parliament in colonial affairs with the exception of a modest, and largely evaded, 
collection of Navigation Acts.14 This detachment had bred a spirit of autonomy and self- 
government in the colonies resulting in the development of a series of “mature, stable, 
social, and political institutions controlled by indigenous local elites.”15 With the self- 
sufficiency of these institutions seemingly now endangered and without elected 
representation in the British Parliament, many colonials began to feel that their individual
13 Daniel Marston, The American Revolution, 1774-1783 (New York: Routledge, 2003) 9; Francis D. 
Cogliano, Revolutionary America, 1763-1815: A Political History (New York: Routledge, 2000), 25.
14 Marston, The American Revolution, 1774-1783, 9.
15 Cogliano, 25.
13
rights and liberties, as British ^ citizens, were being threatened. These concerns only 
intensified following the passage of other, similar taxes including The Quartering Act 
(1765), The Townshend Revenue Act (1767) and later the Tea Act (1773) and the 
Coercive Acts (1774). In response, the colonials embarked upon a kind of ideological 
journey which, beginning as a defense of their traditional autonomy, would later 
culminate in a full declaration of American sovereignty and independence from Great 
Britain.16
Among the more initially obscure figures in this tumult was a Colonel in the 
Virginia colonial militia named George Washington. A wealthy planter and British 
trained veteran of the Seven Years War, Washington had remained politically aloof in the 
early years of the struggle. However, following Parliament’s increasingly obtrusive 
actions, the Colonel soon came to prominence as an active and powerful member of a 
rising group of outspoken elite patriots. In time, Washington would earn the respect of 
many within the Virginia political community and beyond, building an impressive 
reputation and eventually becoming, arguably, the most powerful individual in colonial 
America.
Eventually the sentiments of patriots like Washington began to take hold in many 
Americans resulting in a widespread popular call for colonial unification. Ultimately 
these developments would culminate in the development of an intercolonial, 
representative convention which would serve as a new forum for collective colonial self- 
expression and protest. Beginning with the First Continental Congress of 1774 and 
continuing with the Second Continental Congress a year later, these conventions began 
growing in power and prominence, increasingly taking on the roles normally reserved for
16 Cogliano, 23,
14
a legal administrative body. As the direct control of the king and his parliament over the 
colonies began to disintegrate, the Congress continued to evolve, ultimately growing 
“into the institution that served as the central government for a new American state
1 7through eight years of war and five years of uneasy peace.”
Despite the rapid growth of the Congress’ authority, its delegates often quarreled 
among themselves. The divisions among the representatives reflected those of a diverse 
populace, threatening the concept of colonial unity. From an early period, however, one 
basic idea united the leaders of the colonies: the wisdom of their commander-in-chief. 
From the moment of his election as the supreme leader of the united colonial army, 
Washington, being perceived as a leader of credibility and skill, remained consistently 
supported by the majority of the Congress. This support allowed the General’s 
preferences to be translated into action, giving him a profound amount of political
1 flinfluence. In time, this allowed the General and the Congress, working together, to 
influence colonial public opinion through a series of propagandistic acts, leading many 
Americans to support the legitimacy of the new colonial government and its 
independence movement.
17 Jerrilyn Greene Marston, King and Congress: The Transfer o f  Political Legitimacy, 1774-1776 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987), 67-68.
18 Ibid., 133.
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III. Propaganda and Revolution
Propaganda figured heavily in both the Glorious Revolution and the American 
Revolution. Through a series of both direct and indirect means, English, Dutch and 
American revolutionaries were able to successfully present their ideologies among the 
general populations, resulting in the broad dissemination of their message and the 
eventual legitimization of their revolutionary governments. Many elements of these 
revolutions and their propaganda campaigns are dissimilar. The nature of the goals of the 
revolutionaries, their relationship vis-a-vis their opponents and the authority structures of 
their governments and propaganda campaigns are all strikingly different. Despite these 
distinctions, however, there are a number of important correlations between the symbolic, 
propagandists figureheads of the movements, the types of propaganda used by the 
revolutionaries, and the specific tactics and language used in the propaganda. This section 
will detail these differences and similarities and discuss what they suggest about the 
larger movements and the individuals involved in them.
Fundamental Differences
Any comparison of the propaganda of the Glorious Revolution and the American 
Revolution must acknowledge several fundamental differences between the revolutions 
and their propaganda campaigns. The Glorious revolutionaries were chiefly motivated by 
political and especially religious concerns. Displeased by the policies enacted by James II 
(policies that were often influenced by the sovereign’s faith) a group of foreigners, aided
16
by Englishmen loyal to their cause, decided to forcibly change England’s political and 
religious situation for their own benefit. Their movement was justified by a lawful claim 
to the English throne which William of Orange possessed as well as a mandate, granted 
to the prince by a group of high ranking English politicians (speaking ostensibly on 
behalf of the English people), which he believed entitled him to invade and later to usurp 
the kingship. As a result, William and his supporters must primarily be seen more as 
invaders or perhaps more kindly as foreign deliverers. While they were more or less 
welcomed by the English the fact remains that they chose consciously to involve 
themselves in an external political and religious situation that did not directly concern 
them. They generally should not be considered internal rebels or insurgents.
The American revolutionaries were motivated by political and in particular 
ideological concerns. Their quarrel with King George, their self-acknowledged sovereign, 
was not a religious one and instead principally involved the concept of representation in 
government according to a radical Whig understanding of the English Constitution. 
Offended by the political policies enacted by Parliament and the king and desirous to 
have a more prominent voice in the development of the laws which governed them, the 
delegates of the Continental Congress used a variety of different methods to attempt to 
convince the British government to redress their grievances. Ultimately, the 
revolutionaries felt they had little choice but to use armed force to rebel against British 
control and form their own independent government so that they could defend their rights 
and liberties themselves. There was little legal precedent for this and colonists justified 
their actions philosophically. Consequently, the Congress and its leaders such as George
17
Washington, must be classified as rebels, insurgents or insurrectionists; leaders of a 
revolt that began from inside rather than outside the British Empire.
The goals at the outset of each movement, and the ways in which the 
revolutionaries were prepared to attain them, were also very different. William of Orange 
invaded England to take over its government and reduce its king to a pawn and he had no 
compunction about using military force to do this. After restoring the Protestant faith to 
the English people he then planned to compel their government to join an alliance against 
Louis XIV and go to war against him. In contrast, the Continental Congress, at first, 
hoped to settle its dispute with King George using peaceful measures. Most colonists 
very much desired to remain a part of the British Empire and as a result were initially 
unwilling to renounce their allegiance to it. Thus, the Continental Congress can be seen 
as a group of somewhat reluctant revolutionaries. Furthermore, many congressmen 
questioned their legal ability to raise an army, appoint generals and wage war.
Finally, the leadership structure of these revolutions and their propaganda 
campaigns were also strikingly dissimilar. For all intents and purposes, the Glorious 
Revolution was the revolution of William of Orange. While other leaders such as 
William’s wife, Mary had a vested interest in the movement and ancillary figures such as 
Gilbert Burnet and Gaspel Fagel were instrumental in the crafting of the movement’s 
propagandistic messages and helping the prince implement his ambitious plans, William, 
more so than any other individual, was the architect and the director of the uprising. He 
alone was able to navigate the bureaucratic minefields that complicated the politics of the 
Seven Provinces and England and he alone was able to act as an influential symbol for 
the movement.
18
In comparison, the American Revolution was a far more decentralized and 
democratic event. No single individual was able to dictate the actions of the revolution at 
a national level and control the content of the movement’s propaganda. Instead, the 
Continental Congress was largely responsible for organizing the colonial response in as 
unified a way as it could. While many influential pieces of propaganda such as Thomas 
Paine’s Common Sense were released independent of the Congress, the body brought 
together “many of the more able propagandists in the colonies” and accordingly became 
the source of “the most important political agency for the spreading of ideas.”19 While 
individuals such as General Washington exercised a certain amount of powerful, semi­
centralized control over the movement, no one colonist was ever able to act in the same 
capacity as a European prince.
These distinctions are important and complicate a comparison of the events to a 
certain extent. Nevertheless, despite the fundamental differences between them, the 
Glorious Revolution and the American Revolution and the propaganda of each movement 
share some surprising similarities.
William and Washington
Both revolutions boast prominent figureheads, who despite exercising differing 
degrees of power in their movements, acted as remarkably effective propaganda symbols 
that embodied the core principles of their revolutions.
19 Philip Davidson, Propaganda and the American Revolution, 1763-1783 (Chapel Hill, N.C.: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1941), 354.
19
William of Orange was seen to exemplify the values of the Glorious Revolution 
in many ways. Recognized throughout Europe as a consummate protestant man of war, 
William had spent the better part of his adult life using military force to defend his
o ncountry in a series of religious wars. Having stemmed the tide of Louis XIV’s 
incursions into the Protestant Netherlands, William’s expertise as a commander was held 
in high regard. Additionally, throughout his career, and especially during his invasion of 
England, the prince displayed a bold, risk-taking resolve which made the prospect of 
facing him in battle a daunting one.21 Finally, William’s well documented hatred for 
“popery” made his status as a faithful and fervent Protestant beyond reproach. These 
factors made William the perfect individual to rescue the English people from the
damaging policies of an absolutist Catholic king who despite his unpopularity remained
•  22very powerful and, to all outward appearances, very capable of defending his crown and 
unwilling to give up his faith. The British Parliament admitted this much in their 
declaration of December 11, 1688, by referring to the Prince of Orange as a man who 
“with so great kindness to these nations, so vast experience, and so much hazard to his 
own person, hath undertaken.. .to rescue us.. .from the imminent dangers of popery and 
slavery.”23
In a similar way, George Washington appeared to constantly epitomize the 
principles of the America Revolution. In a movement which ideologically dedicated itself 




23 A Declaration o f  the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, In and About the Cities o f  London and Westminster, 
Assembled at Guildhall (December 11, 1688), ed. Robert Beddard, in A Kingdom without a King: The 
Journal o f the Provisional Government in the Revolution o f 1688 (Oxford: Phaidon Press, 1988), 71-72.
20
held in higher esteem or more celebrated as the model of the virtuous republican 
gentleman than the commander-in-chief.24 The General’s ostensible dedication to “the 
greater good,” is well documented as he refused to receive a salary for his work as the 
commander of the Continental Army and later chose to resign his powerful command to 
retire to his estate. Additionally, his skill as a veteran of the Seven Years War was well 
established. Arguably the most experienced officer in the colonies at the time of his 
nomination, Washington was praised by John Adams during the Second Continental 
Congress as a “gentlemen” whose “skill and experience as an officer...is very well 
known to all of us.”25 Thus, no one was better suited to defend the territory of the 
colonies on the battlefield while also defending its principles against reproach through the 
quality of his character.
The fact that these two men so perfectly embodied their revolutions is no 
accident. It is a testament to the power of the propaganda machines that supported them 
and their own willingness to personally use and otherwise support their movement’s 
propaganda iii order to appear as committed to the principles of their movements as they 
could.
William of Orange, the main director of the Glorious Revolution’s propaganda 
campaign, understandably used indoctrination extensively throughout the movement to 
craft the way that he would be perceived by those around him. His attention to his 
reputation as well as the way that his invasion and his subsequent seizure of the throne 
would be received by the English people is evident throughout the propaganda created
24 Gordon Wood, “The Greatness o f George Washington” in George Washington Reconsidered, ed. Don 
Higgonbotham (Charlottesville: University Press o f Virginia, 2001), 314.
25 Edward G. Lengel, This Glorious Struggle: George Washington’s Revolutionary War Letters (New 
York: HarperCollins, 2007), 3-4.
21
not only by William himself but also by his supporters which he often directly 
supervised. William constantly choreographed his appearance in order to not only appear 
virtuous in English eyes but also, when possible, to evoke appropriate religious or 
historical imagery.26 One such example of this involves William’s decision to time his 
landing at Torbay in such a way that landfall was made on November 5th, the anniversary 
of the Gunpowder Plot, a date which carried incredible significance to English 
protestants. In addition, William, a man “capable of the greatest dissimulation” often had 
no problem deceitfully using propaganda to cloak his actions. For example, following 
the birth of the Prince of Wales, only months before his invasion, William sent a 
congratulatory letter to his father-in-law praising the miraculous nature of the birth. 
Considering the fact that many within England and the Seven Provinces (including 
William’s wife) strongly doubted the legitimacy of the birth and that it would based upon 
this suspicion that the prince would later launch his invasion, the nature of his letter is 
immediately suspicious. Whatever the intention of the letter, William’s actions angered 
many of his supporters. The Invitation to William from the “Immortal Seven” which 
would follow shortly thereafter in fact directly chastised the prince for his 
correspondence. Stating that the document “hath done you some injury” the invitation 
warned that the topic was a delicate one which the prince should handle with more care 
because “the false imposing of [the birth] upon the princess and the nation” was “not only 
an infinite exasperation of people's minds here” but was also “certainly one of the chief 
causes upon which the declaration of your entering the kingdom in a hostile manner must
26 Lisa Jardine, Going Dutch: How England Plundered Holland's Glory (New York: Harper, 2008), 16.
27 Hoak, 22.
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be founded on your part.”28 In the end, I believe few if any historians question William’s 
deeply rooted role in the propaganda of the Glorious Revolution and the more 
unscrupulous character traits which his involvement in that campaign reveal.
For George Washington, however, the situation is more complicated. To the best 
of our understanding, Washington does not appear to have acted as a stereotypical 
revolutionary propagandist. While some of his actions and their purposes may be 
challenged and a hidden set of his guarded true intentions may be surmised, the fact 
remains that George Washington does not appear to have carried on his role as a 
figurehead of the American Revolution in the same kind of duplicitous fashion as a figure 
like William of Orange. This may in part be due to the fact that the more decentralized 
authority structure of the American Revolution made it far more difficult for a figure such 
as the commander-in-chief to control the presentation of his public image using 
propaganda. Thus, to a certain extent, Washington did not have the same opportunity to 
engage in deception that a figure such as William of Orange did. Despite this, however, 
Washington’s character still in many ways appears to be above serious reproach.
If one desires proof of this fact, they need only look at the scene surrounding his 
initial assumption of command as the leader of the Continental Army. Using evidence 
collected from several sources it is the almost unanimous opinion of today’s scholars that 
Washington did not actively seek the commission of Command-in-Chief. His assumption 
of power was apparently entirely unexpected and undesired.
When he was first nominated for the position by John Adams in a session of the 
Continental Congress on June 14, 1775, Washington reportedly fled the chamber
28 The Invitation to William (June 30, 1688), ed. Andrew Browning, in English Historical Documents, 
1660-1714 (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1953), 120-122.
23
• « 90immediately. His subsequent speech of acceptance two days later was remarkably 
gracious. The Virginian repeatedly stated his thanks to the Congress and noted the great 
honor which had been done to him. The new general also stated repeatedly and “with the 
utmost sincerity” that he did not believe he was worthy of the command he was being 
offered.30 His acceptance of it he declared was due only to the importance and greatness 
of the cause which the revolutionaries were struggling for. Finally, he stated that in order 
to assure the Congress that no “pecuniary consideration” influenced him to accept his 
new position, he would not accept a salary.
Washington’s personal letters to his wife also appear to suggest that his new 
position was one that he not only did not desire but also sought to evade. Assuring 
Martha “in the most solemn manner” the General writes that “so far from seeking this 
appointment I have used every endeavor in my power to avoid it, not only from my
• 31unwillingness.. .but from a consciousness of its being too great for my capacity.” 
Additionally, Washington relates that despite reluctance “it was utterly out of my power 
to refuse this appointment without exposing my character to such censures as would have 
reflected dishonor upon myself, and given pain to my friends.” Making his uneasiness 
and unhappiness clear, it appears that the new commander-in-chief is as unassuming as 
he possibly could be under the circumstances.
Further support is provided by Washington’s friends and colleagues such as 
Patrick Henry who relates to us the General’s behavior on the day of his acceptance of
29 Edward G. Lengel, General George Washington: A Military Life (New York: Random House, 2007), 88.
30 George Washington, Address to the Continental Congress (June 16, 1775), ed. Philander D. Chase et al, 
in The Papers o f George Washington: Revolutionary War Series, 18 vols. to date (Charlottesville: 
University Press o f Virginia, 1985), 1:1.
31 George Washington to Martha Washington (June 18, 1775), ed. Philander D. Chase et al, in The Papers 
o f George Washington: Revolutionary War Series, 18 vols. to date (Charlottesville: University Press o f  
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the position of commander-in-chief. According to Henry, Washington was highly 
distressed and overcome with tears and reportedly told his friend and fellow Virginian 
that “From the day I enter upon the command of the American armies, I date my fall, and 
the ruin of my reputation.”32
Despite this evidence, however, a number of facts appear to belie some of these 
statements made by Washington. Examining the evidence, I believe it is possible, at the 
very least, to suggest that a more complicated and calculated individual may lie behind 
the public image of the General that continues to flourish even today. For the fact remains 
that despite all his modesty and selflessness, Washington was still able to become an 
influential propaganda symbol and a powerful symbolic figurehead of the American 
revolutionary movement. How is this possible? It is possible because Washington 
personally, actively, and successfully cultivated his public image and remained willing to 
participate in and provide support for the tenuous American propaganda campaign which 
the revolutionaries attempted to conduct. The extensive reputation that the General built 
for himself enabled him to effectively act “as a propaganda and political asset” that “from 
the very beginning greatly enhanced the American cause.”
For evidence of this it is best to further examine the circumstances surrounding 
Washington’s assumption of command and his arrival in Cambridge. Throughout the 
spring and summer of 1775, as the prospect of a larger war with Britain grew more and 
more likely, many patriots began to search for a capable commander, loyal to the 
American cause, who would be willing to offer his services. Washington, having fought 
for the British with distinction in the Seven Years War, was seen by many as the ideal
32 Lengel, This Glorious Struggle, 4.
33 Carl Berger, Broadsides and Bayonets: The Propaganda War o f the American Revolution (Philadelphia: 
University o f Pennsylvania Press, 1961), 217.
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man to lead a united army of colonists.34 In addition to his military credentials, the 
commander’s role as a wealthy planter and delegate to the Continental Congress (a 
delegate with the power to act as a unifying factor between North and South) made him 
all the more enticing.
Washington was undoubtedly well aware of all this and despite the modesty 
apparent in his later acceptance of the position, he very much desired to be the 
Commander-in-Chief. Many of the General’s correspondences from nearly a decade of 
military service as well as seventeen years as a planter and politician expose key elements 
of his personality, such as his “long standing ambition” for a successful military career.36 
Some historians have noted this “ardent” personal hunger for fame which “can be 
demonstrated over and over by his own words.” The command of the American armies 
afforded Washington the career and the fame which he so deeply desired while also 
offering him the ability to embarrass the very same British army which had previously
- I Q
refused him promotion. Thus, while he may not have overtly desired to command the 
colonial army, he must have, at the very least, understood the enormous opportunity that 
lay before him if he were successful.
Despite this Washington chose not to actively pursue the command of a colonial 
army, a move which may suggest a certain degree of personal machination on his part. 
Instead of directly campaigning, he took the appropriate steps to avoid any outward sign
34 Douglas Southall Freeman, George Washington: A Biography (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 
1951), 3:433; Lengel, General George Washington: A Military Life, 87.
35 William M. S. Rasmussen, George Washington: The Man Behind the Myths (Charlottesville: University 
Press o f Virginia, 1999), 111.
36 Ibid.
37 W.W. Abbot, “An Uncommon Awareness o f Self: The Papers of George Washington” in George 




of interest or impropriety. In so doing, Washington was working to build his closely 
guarded, virtuous reputation; an attribute that he felt was the single most important key to
• •  o nhis attainment of any personal goal. Over and over in fact, Washington’s actions reveal 
that he possessed an “uncommon awareness of self,” a sense that “what he decided and 
what he did, and how others perceived his decisions and deeds, always mattered.”40 This 
explains why, whenever possible, the General appears as if he not only did not desire the 
position of Commander-in-Chief but was actually unfit for it because of a lack of military 
experience.
Thus, it was personal virtue and in particular modesty that formed the centerpiece 
of Washington’s carefully crafted public persona. As a result, by doing his best to appear 
as much like a virtuous republican gentleman as he could, Washington earned great 
praise and would be elevated to an extremely distinguished status in the eyes of many 
patriots 41 The commander’s “personal standards became a model” for others to follow, 
allowing him to sustain his army through years of bitter conflict42 As time went on in 
fact the General would be continually celebrated as the true embodiment of 
republicanism in action and key individual who could transform the new American nation 
into a “republican utopia.”43 Indeed as Thomas Jefferson would write to the commander- 
in-chief after the Treaty of Paris, it was the “moderation and virtue of a single character” 
that had “prevented this revolution from being closed as most others have been by a
39 Gordon Wood, “The Greatness o f George Washington” in George Washington Reconsidered, ed. Don 
Higginbotham, (Charlottesville: University Press o f Virginia, 2001), 317.
40 Abbot, “An Uncommon Awareness o f Self,” 277.
41 Wood, “The Greatness o f George Washington,” 314
42 Rasmussen, 112.
43 Gordon Wood, The Radicalism o f  the American Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), 145-225.
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subversion of that liberty it was intended to establish.”44 This character to whom 
Jefferson referred was undoubtedly none other than Washington. Thus, more so than any 
other individual Washington was seen as an exemplary gentleman patriot who should be 
emulated; and he was very aware of this fact.45
This evidence is instructive, since in many ways Washington was not a 
gentleman. He had never attended college, spoke no foreign languages, and was not an 
exceptionally gifted man of letters.46 His family, while definitely part of the landed 
planter gentry, was neither overly successful nor influential in government. Yet to the 
best of his ability, Washington strove to look and act the part. His strict adherence to the 
text Rules o f  Civility and Decent Behavior in Company and Conversation, which he had 
studied from an early age, was quite helpful. Additionally his quiet, courteous demeanor 
was seen to command respect and exude strength.
Simply put, despite certain shortcomings, Washington successfully used written 
correspondence and public action to appear virtuous among those whom he wished to 
influence. This fact is made clear many times throughout the General’s life, including 
during his appearance at the Second Continental Congress. Attending every session of the 
Congress dressed in his blue and red British military uniform Washington, without saying 
a word, demonstrated his willingness to take up arms.47 The uniform not only expressed a 
willingness to fight but also reminded those present of the formidable tasks undertaken 
and completed in that uniform.48 At the same time, however, the Virginian appeared to
44 Thomas Jefferson to George Washington (April 16, 1784), ed Julian P. Boyd et al, in The Papers o f  
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hold out hope for reconciliation by voting in favor of all measures that attempted it. Thus, 
while firmly committed to the patriot cause, Washington was very careful to keep his 
personal beliefs in check and therefore did not fill the statehouse with lengthy speeches.49 
Instead, he silently embodied the belief that formally taking up arms with Britain should 
be avoided at all costs but if one day it became unavoidable, he was ready and willing to 
offer his services.
The opportunity came in the opening days of June 1775. With news of Lexington 
and Concord already spreading throughout the colonies and groups of Massachusetts 
militiamen gathering to combat the British in Boston, Congress at last believed that they 
had no choice but to commit to an armed conflict. Upon the formal creation of an 
American army, the delegates immediately looked to Washington to be its commander 
and the ambitious Virginian did not fail to take advantage of the situation.
Accepting the command, Washington wrote a group of letters to his wife 
explaining his situation, met briefly with friends and supporters in the Congress and then 
embarked for Cambridge with crowds of well wishers greeting him along the way. When 
he arrived outside Boston and took formal command of the army his actions were widely 
reported in colonial newspapers. Additionally, Washington took it upon himself to ensure 
that the propaganda released by the Congress was properly distributed among his troops. 
Upon the issuance of the Declaration o f the Causes and Necessity o f  Taking Up Arms, the 
General had the document read aloud in assembly. This tactic would be repeated 
throughout the war as Washington did his part to make sure that the propagandist^ 
messages of the Congress were circulated properly.
49 Ibid., 85.
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Taking all this into account, I believe it is clear that Washington, ever the skillful 
tactician of politics and war, must be seen as a willing participant in the American 
revolutionary propaganda war. Through his actions and his words, the General not only 
supported the propaganda of the war but also consciously misled those around him in 
order to personally indoctrinate them. The fact remains, however, that the General 
tempered his skill at playing the propaganda game with a desire to remain detached from 
the unscrupulous nature of the conflict. Understanding “the necessity for encouraging the 
people,” Washington knew what needed to be done in order to capture the support of the 
American population for the revolutionary struggle, and “constantly recommended 
pertinent opportunities to [his] literary friends.”50 Thus, he was always very careful to 
control his placement and purpose in the campaign. Rather than take a role as a principal 
creator of the nation’s propaganda, the General instead chose to act as a facilitator of 
various revolutionary messages. This is why, while some of Washington’s widely 
distributed addresses, declarations, and petitions carry a propagandistic quality, in most 
cases, he had nothing to do with the formal creation of the rhetoric of America’s war of 
words. Nevertheless, the commander-in-chief “on several occasions gave the 
propagandists their cue and was always conscious of the need for their activity.”51 In 
addition, we cannot overlook the fact that the declarations and addresses of the 
Continental Congress would not have been able to have an effective impact on the 
American people if it were not for George Washington. As the revolution’s key 




Congress would make allowing their declarations and resolves to carry a greater 
influence.
From all this information I believe it is clear that both William of Orange and 
George Washington embodied their revolutions by conveying a dedication to the core 
principles of the movements which others could see and potentially emulate. This 
enabled both men to act as powerful symbolic figureheads of their revolutions. It was 
made possible by the use of propaganda which allowed both men to support their 
revolutions and themselves so that both the movement and its leader appeared in as 
positive a way as possible.
Types and Tactics of Propaganda
In addition to the roles played by Washington and William, elements of the larger 
propaganda campaigns o f these two revolutions also have important similarities. With the 
help of the larger bodies of government which not only supported these leaders but also 
helped craft and release a great deal of propaganda, these campaigns often used not only 
the same types of propaganda (both broad, public displays of persuasion as well as more 
direct, private forms) but also, in certain cases, the same tactics and the same language to 
effectively disseminate their revolutionary messages to their extremely diverse audiences.
For both sets of revolutionaries the most popular form of propaganda was 
undoubtedly the formal declaration. Whether issued by legislatures, prominent political 
figures, private individuals, or other informally organized political groups, these 
documents, often highly visible through their publication in newspapers, pamphlets and
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broadsides, or their recitation in city streets or other public places, were created 
specifically for the purpose of carrying the message to as many people as possible. With 
regards to this essay, the declarations directly issued or otherwise orchestrated by legal 
governmental authorities, or those desiring to be considered as such, carry a special 
significance.
William of Orange used declarations extensively before, after and even during his 
landing at Torbay in order to announce his supposed intentions to the English people as 
well as the rest of Europe. The Declaration o f  the Hague (also known as the Declaration 
o f  Reasons) perhaps the first mass statement of William’s revolutionary message, 
provides an excellent example of this. While it was originally intended to be released in 
unison with the invasion, the declaration was inadvertently leaked beforehand and almost 
immediately became readily available to commoners throughout England. In pamphlet 
form it became “highly visible” and quite literally “everywhere” in the final month 
leading up to the landing. Thanks to William’s agents, it was translated into four 
languages and was read aloud among the prince’s partisans in the streets of many major 
English cities including the capital. In addition, the document was also carried with 
William on his voyage, designed to be printed off ad infinitium through the use of a 
mobile printing press and a group of printers and copywriters, brought along expressly 
for the purpose.54
The prince would continue to use similar, highly visible documents to spread his 
revolutionary messages as he approached London and later completed a military conquest





of the capital. During this time, as James attempted to flee for France and mob violence 
began to break out in London and other cities, William began using his pronouncements 
to return order to the country. Later with the capital and a provisional government under 
his control, the prince would continue to use propaganda in order to gain the favor of the 
Convention Parliament and ensure that a favorable settlement of the crisis was obtained. 
In addition to William’s pronouncements, the Parliament itself also used declarations as 
part of its efforts to settle the dispute between William and James during this period.
In a similar way, the Continental Congress issued a number of influential 
declarations such as the Declaration and Resolves o f the First Continental Congress, the 
Declaration o f the Causes and Necessity and the Declaration o f  Independence in order to 
attempt to influence large populations. While these pronouncements were principally part 
of a larger political dialogue between the Congress and the English Parliament and King 
George, the popular power of these documents must not be underestimated. Additionally, 
but to a lesser extent, General George Washington, used his prominent position as 
commander-in-chief to issue influential declarations such as his Address to the 
Inhabitants o f Canada which often espoused the same kinds of sentiments as the 
Congress.
In addition to these formal declarations, other documents were released by both 
sets of revolutionaries; documents which despite their indirect nature were still very 
important for their ability to spread propagandist^ information to large audiences. These 
documents included various speeches, letters and petitions made by William,
Washington, the Parliament and Congress which were initially, in one form or another,
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directed toward one particular audience, but were then widely distributed, using a 
different medium, to a larger one.
It is important to note here that as we discuss the similarities among these 
revolutions and their more indirect forms of propaganda, there are also further differences 
which appear. While both the American and Glorious Revolutions made use of indirect 
propaganda, they did not always use exactly the same kinds. The propaganda of the 
Glorious Revolution, for instance, was often transmitted through sermons, especially 
those delivered by Gilbert Burnet, one of William of Orange’s greatest propaganda 
agents. While sermons were undoubtedly a very big part of the American Revolution as 
well, the Continental Congress and other patriot leaders did not have the power to direct 
the American churches to say anything. Thus, when considering the propaganda 
campaigns of these revolutions from a national level, we cannot directly compare their 
sermons. Nevertheless, if we examine the content of all these various direct and indirect 
forms (declarations, pamphlets, sermons, letters, speeches and petitions) together, despite 
differences in their frequency, we immediately begin to see several important similarities.
First, despite the fact that the two revolutions were fought for very different 
reasons, both sets of revolutionaries used propaganda to frame their conflict in religious 
terms. In so doing both the English and the American revolutionaries used strikingly 
similar language to reinforce their arguments.
Examining William’s Declaration o f the Hague, we can see that from the very 
beginning the concept of religion was prominent in the prince’s rhetoric. In the 
declaration William states that “religion, laws, and liberties” of the realm have been
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“overturned,” by the “arbitrary” actions of England’s current government.55 He elaborates 
by explaining several ways that the king and in particular his counselors have broken 
their promise to “maintain the Church of England as it was established by law.” Each of 
these examples highlights the current government’s lack of support for the Protestant 
faith and attempts to conflate that lack of support with illegality. William closes by 
stating that one of the main reasons for his invasion is the “preservation of the Protestant 
religion” and that he plans to “chiefly rely on the blessing of God for the success of this 
our undertaking, in which we place our whole and only confidence.”
Following this work, various declarations released by William make some 
reference to religion in one form or another. The prince’s Third Declaration reiterates 
many of the same religious points of his first as it reaffirms William’s “fervent zeal for 
the Protestant religion” and refers to his invasion (which at this point was in its more 
advanced stages) as “the Blessed and Glorious Design which by the Favor of Heaven we 
have so successfully begun.”56 However, one document in particular, a letter originally 
written by William to the sailors of the English fleet on the eve of his invasion carried an 
especially strong religious tone. The correspondence states the prince’s “hope that 
almighty God will inspire you [the English sailors] with such thoughts as may facilitate 
your deliverance and preserve you, your country, and your religion in all these impending 
miseries.” It then cautions the seamen that they are being “made use of only as
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instruments to bring this nation under popery and slavery.” The letter then concludes by 
listing, in its entirety, a prayer used by the Dutch fleet, translated from the Dutch into 
English specifically for the document, which William’s invading force was undoubtedly 
planning to use during its expedition.
As William advanced on London and Parliament began to throw their full support 
behind him, so too did the Lords Spiritual and Temporal take up this religious language. 
Stating that it could no longer “be silent under those calamities, wherein the popish 
counsels which so long prevailed, have miserably involved these realms,” the body 
affirmed its faith in the Protestant religion and promised that jt would ensure that the 
religion was “supported and encouraged to the Glory of God and the happiness of the 
established government in these kingdoms.”58
Later in an effort to secure these goals and to promote peace and tranquility 
throughout the capital and the city of Westminster, Parliament and later the Prince of 
Orange both released declarations ordering all Catholics in those two cities to leave. 
Claiming that their actions were “for the better preservation of the peace and common 
safety”59 the documents both threaten punishment for those who do not cooperate and 
enlist local law enforcement in order to ensure that the new statutes are upheld.
In fact, even the more mundane declarations issued by William and the 
Parliament during this period reference religion, albeit in an indirect manner. When 
dealing with the proper collection of taxes the prince makes reference to “collectors,
58 A Declaration o f  the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, In and About the Cities o f  London and Westminster, 
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receivers and officers (not being papists).”60 Likewise, when reestablishing order in the 
capital William calls on “every person (not being a papist) that upon the first day of 
December last was in any office or employment.. to return to work.61
However, William and his partisans most effectively used religion by taking 
control of the English church and using the pulpit to broadcast a concerted religious 
message. Leading this effort was Gilbert Burnet, an Anglican cleric who had served 
William and his wife since 1686 as a close personal friend and spiritual counselor.62 One 
of Burnet’s most important sermons was delivered on December 23, 1688, at St. James’ 
palace with a large audience of notable partisans in attendance including the Prince of 
Orange himself. By this time, William’s successful landing at Torbay and occupation of 
London had placed him in de-facto control of England and its government. Despite this 
William faced several challenges. Desperate to grow beyond the rhetoric of the 
Declaration o f  the Hague which by this time had been largely abandoned by the 
revolutionaries, William had turned to Burnet in the hope that he could help emphasize 
the religious implications of William’s appearance in England and his potential 
assumption of the throne. Accordingly, the sermon is full of religious imagery and makes 
many bold claims about William, his invasion and God’s role in it.
Beginning with a psalm and alluding to various pieces of scripture throughout, 
Burnet is careful to call attention to the “amazing concurrence of providences” that have
60 A Declaration o f  His Highness the Prince o f  Orange, fo r  the Better Collecting the Public Revenue 
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occurred surrounding William and his appearance in England.63 Stating over and over 
again that the circumstances are “the Lord’s doing” Burnet points to a series of examples 
of how God has intervened on England’s behalf and how these instances are very clear, 
and begs the audience to see them and understand them properly as the work of God. 
Among the seemingly miraculous events mentioned by Burnet are the “Protestant Wind” 
which accompanied William’s landing and the “sudden and unbloody issue to which it 
was so unexpectedly brought.” Referring to William as “Our Great Deliverer” and “the 
instrument whom God has highly exalted in bringing about so great a work by his means” 
the cleric makes it clear that William and his actions should be appreciated. His words 
also subtly hint that God will continue to do wondrous things through William as time 
goes on. Burnet also takes the opportunity to attack the Catholic religion and ostensibly 
James II and his regime by referring to it as “a religion that dissolves faith and good 
reason and gives authority both to perfidy and cruelty.” The sermon concludes by stating 
that while many wondrous things have happened in the revolution, it is not yet complete 
and thus, because it is God’s work, “we ought not to stop the course of it till it had had its 
full effect” and let it “attain its full perfection.” In this way Burnet and William are 
almost certainly alluding to William and his interest in claiming the throne, an action 
which the pair hopes the people will also interpret as being part of God’s plan.
Similarly, the American revolutionaries often used religion to support their cause, 
frequently stating that it had been blessed with “divine favor.”64 Documents such as the
63 Gilbert Burnet, Sermon Delivered at St. Jam es’s Before His Highness the Prince o f Orange (December 
23, 1688), Harvard University Library.
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Declaration o f  the Causes and Necessity o f  Taking Up Arms, for instance, are full of 
references to “the divine Author of our existence.” Asserting the colonists’ intent to go to 
battle by “exerting the utmost energy of those powers which our beneficent Creator hath 
graciously bestowed upon us,” the document also includes a direct invocation to the 
almighty, stating that “with a humble confidence in the mercies of the supreme and 
impartial Judge and Ruler of the Universe” the colonists “most devoutly implore His 
divine goodness to protect us happily through this great conflict.” The Declaration o f  
Independence contains comparable language as it refers to “The Laws of Nature and of 
Nature’s God,” and inalienable rights endowed by a “Creator.” It states that the colonies 
are “appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions” and 
concludes by stating that the revolutionaries have resolved themselves to independence 
“with a firm reliance on the protection of divine Providence.” Several other documents 
from the Congress contain subtle religious overtones. The Declaration and Resolves o f  
the First Continental Congress states that, in order to protect their “religion, laws and 
liberties” from being “subverted” by the actions of the English government, the 
representatives have met in convention and issued a definitive statement of their rights. 
Additionally, texts such as George Washington’s Address to the Inhabitants o f Canada 
declare that the Americans are aided in the struggle by their belief that God has thus far 
“smiled upon our virtuous efforts.”65
Despite its lack of centralized control and the absence of a national church, the 
Continental Congress, while never able to make a concerted effort to indoctrinate the
65 George Washington, Address to the Inhabitants o f  Canada (September 14, 1775), ed. Philander D. Chase 
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colonies through American churches, did attempt to use religion in other ways. For 
instance, Congress and its leaders attempted to take control of the observance of certain 
religious ceremonies. This included appointing “annually a day in the spring for fasting, 
humiliation, and prayer, and a day in the autumn for thanks giving.”66 Additionally, 
General Washington often attempted to manage and in some cases restrain the religious 
activities of his troops. For example on November 5, 1775, members of the Continental 
Army outside Boston engaged in a decades old tradition reserved for public expressions 
of anti-Catholicism: Guy Fawkes Day. This holiday involved, among other things, a 
public celebration where crowds would often burn an effigy of the pope. In his General 
Order for that day, General Washington ridiculed the holiday and its practice of burning 
the effigy as a “ridiculous and childish custom.” Reminding his troops of the need to 
obtain “the friendship and alliance of the people of Canada” the General stated that “at 
such a juncture, and in such circumstances, to be insulting their religion, is so monstrous,
f\1as not to be suffered or excused.”
However, most attempts to use American churches to spread revolutionary 
messages were done by independent parties who remained unaffiliated with the Congress 
or its leaders. One prominent example involves the so-called “Black Regiment” of 
Massachusetts. This “regiment” was in fact a group of Presbyterian, Baptist, and 
Congregationalist preachers who were accused of espousing the principles of the 
revolution from their pulpits. This group was first identified by Peter Oliver, a loyalist
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who chastised the clerics for taking “so active a part in the rebellion.” Oliver states that 
the group would “preach up manufactures instead of the gospel” to the point where “the 
people would have rather suffered their brains to be beat out of their heads, than to have 
their faith in this absurdity beat out of their brains.”69
Nevertheless, we must remember that whether orchestrated by Congress, its 
supporters, or other unaffiliated groups, none of these efforts were as widespread or as 
generally effective as the efforts of William of Orange and Gilbert Burnet.
In addition to their use of religion, both the Glorious and the American 
revolutionaries frame their disputes using similar secular, political language as well. In 
particular both propaganda campaigns often attack the improper legislative actions of 
their opponents and call for the installation of more representative government policies 
and the limitation of the excesses of monarchy.
On the eve of his invasion, William promised to ensure the assembly of “a free 
and lawful Parliament.. .as soon as possible” and declared that he wished to impress “no 
other design” upon the English people. Ostensibly shunning any interest in the crown 
itself, the prince’s propaganda declares his desire to “concur in everything that may 
procure the peace and happiness of the nation, which a free and lawful Parliament shall 
determine.”70 After his landing William often reiterated these points by stating that he 
hoped to “establish the religion, laws and liberties of those kingdoms upon such a sure 
and lasting foundation, that it shall not be in the power of any prince for the future to
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introduce popery and tyranny.”71 Later, having pledged their support to William, the 
British Parliament weighed in on the issue, going so far as to restate many of the prince’s 
earlier statements verbatim. Praising William for his desire to “procure a free parliament” 
the representatives stated their desire to obtain “such a parliament with all speed, wherein 
our laws, our liberties and properties may be secured.”72
The Continental Congress, labeling itself a “full and free representation” of the 
united colonies continually stated that it had been forced to act because the rights of the 
colonists as English citizens were being disrespected. In a statement of those rights, the 
Congress often took it upon themselves to list those rights and expand on their nature.
The Declaration and Resolves in particular relates “that the respective colonies are 
entitled to the common law of England, and more especially to the great and inestimable 
privilege of being tried by their peers of the vicinage, according to the course of that 
law.”
In addition, these statements about the nature of government and the desire for 
representation often included anti-monarchical language and many direct and fervent 
attacks on monarchs themselves. Burnet’s sermons directly attacked James II, labeling 
his actions as “abominations” which had burdened the English people. The Parliament 
likewise discredited James and his actions, in particular in their declaration issued on 
February 13, 1689, a document which was released under William’s supervision. The 
document listed over twenty grievances against the king and his advisors and stated that
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these acts were undertaken “to subvert and extirpate the Protestant religion, and the laws 
and liberties of this Kingdom.”74
Similarly, Congress chose to directly attack King George and his supposed abuses 
of power, labeling his recent actions “a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all 
having in direct object the establishment of an absolute tyranny over these states.”75 
Detailing this “long train of abuses and usurpations” and the “absolute despotism” 
displayed by the king through them, the Congress listed over twenty detailed grievances 
against their monarch. Based upon these abuses the Congress concluded that “a prince, 
whose character is thus marked by every act which may define a tyrant, is unfit to be the 
ruler of a free people.”
Despite these attacks and their indictment of the abuses of monarchy, each set of 
revolutionaries initially displayed an unwillingness to directly attack the characters of the 
monarchs they opposed. William at first refused to directly attack King James, a family 
member and a sitting monarch (who was also the commander of a formidable army and 
navy) and instead constantly laid the blame upon James’s “evil councilors” and their “ill
n r
designs.” Parliament continued this trend, blaming not James but instead the influence 
put upon him by “the pernicious counsels of persons ill affected to our nation and 
religion.”77
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Congress similarly initially avoided attacking King George and instead chose to 
hold Parliament and “his Majesty’s ministers of state,”78 responsible. Much of the early 
propaganda of the American Revolution in fact went out of its way to avoid direct 
criticism of the sovereign. In one case, the Congress stated that “several threatening 
expressions against the colonies were inserted in his majesty's speech” but refused to 
openly blame the king for those comments.79 In fact, Congress actually went so far as to 
directly petition George III on two occasions, lauding him as “The King’s Most Excellent 
Majesty” and the “Most Gracious Sovereign,” while wishing him a “long and prosperous
Q A
reign” and kindly “beseeching” him to listen to their concerns. These similarities, I 
believe, highlight the interesting parallels in the ways both groups of revolutionaries 
chose to shift their propaganda strategies as the circumstances of the revolutions began to 
change.
Both the Glorious and American revolutionaries also took great care with military 
matters. Directly addressing the reasons impelling them to use military force and 
repeatedly stating that the choice to do so was a necessary and otherwise reluctant one, 
both groups were anxious to appear as passive as possible in their decision to use arms to 
decide their conflicts.
While William’s appearance in England was made in an overtly military way, he 
initially stated that his invasion was being implemented on behalf of the English people 
and that his show of force was not meant to be used to claim the throne. Denying that his
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invasion intended “to conquer and enslave the nation,” William stated that “the forces we 
have brought along with us are utterly disproportioned to that wicked design.”81 He 
continued by relating that he was “confident that no person can have so hard thoughts of
87us” and that “no true Englishman and good Protestant can entertain the least suspicion 
of our firm resolution.”83 Later the prince attempted to make the depth of his commitment 
to his cause plain stating that he and his army were prepared to “spend our dearest blood 
and perish in an attempt than not carry on this Blessed and Glorious design.”84 He also 
continually attempted to announce the strength of his military position by explaining how 
many soldiers in James’ army had “deserted the illegal service they were engaged in 
and.. .come over to us.” Throughout all this, however, the prince was careful to espouse 
his hope of avoiding battle and bloodshed stating that “if it be possible [to claim victory] 
without the effusion of blood.. .we do think fit to declare.. .we will offer no violence to 
any but in our own necessary defense.”
In a similar way, the Continental Congress stated that its decision to raise an army 
and appoint a commander-in-chief was influenced by offense actions of the British 
government and its army which the Congress claimed had “butchered” innocent
O  c
Americans. Throughout the war the delegates would maintain that they did not create 
the Continental Army out of an overt desire to make war and conquer territory. Instead, 
when faced with the option of “an unconditional submission to the tyranny of irritated 
ministers, or resistance by force,” the colonists stated that they were only making the
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most practical choice that they felt was being offered to them.86 In addition, the Congress, 
using strikingly similar language to that of William of Orange, stated that the colonists 
stood “with one mind resolved to die freemen rather than to live slaves.” George 
Washington echoed these sentiments by stating that the crisis between king and colonies 
had “risen to such a height that arm alone must decide it.”87 However, Washington was 
also quick to reiterate his belief that the colonists were fighting not for glory and wealth 
but instead “in defense of our liberty, our property, our wives, and our. children.” The 
commander-in-chief also reiterated the Congress’ commitment to the principles of the 
revolution, stating, with an eerie similarity, that his troops were “prepared to preserve 
them or die.”
Both sets of revolutionaries were also very quick to begin exercising direct 
authority over large groups of people despite their lack of legitimacy. For the Glorious 
revolutionaries, this behavior included the tactic of aiming their declarations toward the 
common man and looking out for the security and safety of civilians by organizing law 
enforcement and delegating authority in much the same way a centralized government 
would. While the American Revolutionaries did this to a certain extent, the lack of 
centralized control over the American citizens made it far more difficult for the Congress 
to suppress mob violence and general disorder. Nevertheless, in the end the increased 
authority given to the convention by its constituents lead the Congress to continue to 
adopt many of the functions of a national government. These included maintaining an 
army, appointing generals, raising money for the war effort, reserving the right to make 
treaties and alliances and in general ensuring that the lives and liberties of the citizens
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were being upheld. Ultimately, these strategies would earn both sets of revolutionaries 
the support of a majority of the common population and help to solidify their 
revolutionary claims.
Following his invasion, and James’ exodus, William made a concerted effort to 
reach out to the English people in the hope of restoring order to the now chaotic cities of 
London and Westminster. At first William did this without any direct authority in the 
interest of filling the power vacuum created by James’ departure. His Third Declaration 
provides a good example of this as it outlines his hope that “all Lord-Lieutenants, 
Deputy-Lieutenants, and Justices of the Peace, Lord-Mayors, Mayors, Sheriffs, and all 
other magistrates and officers civil and military of all counties, cities and towns of 
England” would continue to do their duties and help restore order.
However, later that month Parliament chose to intervene with its own declaration. 
It stated that because James had “withdrawn himself’ it was now up to parliament and 
William to restore order. To this end, the body pledged to “endeavor to preserve the 
peace and security of these great and populous cities of London and Westminster and 
parts adjacent,” and to “assist his Highness” by promoting “His Highnesses intentions for 
the public good.”
Armed with this new mandate William went to work releasing a slew of 
declarations aimed at earning the support of and ostensibly protecting the masses. These 
documents often directly referenced Parliament’s earlier decree by stating that 
representatives had “by their respective applications, desired us to take the administration 
of public affairs, both civil and military and the disposal of public revenue, for the 
preservation of the peace.. .and to exercise the same till the meeting of the intended
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convention.” Thus with the purpose of ensuring “the happy state and peace of the 
kingdom” William went to work “suppressing all riots, routs, and tumultuous 
assemblies,”89 ensuring that the public revenues would once again “run in their proper 
channel” and no longer be “intermeddled with,”90 and making certain that all Catholics 
and repudiated Catholics were being removed from London and Westminster.91
In a similar vein William also took care to ensure that his army was behaving 
properly and that he was doing everything in his power as a military commander to keep 
the peace. This included guaranteeing that no troops were “quartering in private houses”
09unless they had the “free and voluntary consent of the owner” and that any troops that 
had been incorrectly ordered to disperse were being recalled by “Colonels and 
Commanders in Chief of such regiments, troops and companies” and then kept “in good 
order and discipline.”93 Since these earlier disturbances were causing “the public peace 
[to be] very much disturbed,”94 the prince’s actions were met very positively by the 
common people who began to throw their support behind their future king.95
Following suit was Burnet whose sermon on December 23, 1688 called on 
ordinary Englishmen to “see the folly of trusting to that religion and of imagining that 
any weight was to be laid on all the promises that could be made us by them.” In this way
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the sermon not only attacked James and Catholicism together but also cautioned the 
English people about harboring Catholic tendencies or entertaining the thought of 
opposing William and his protestant faith.
However it would not be until after the meeting of the convention and its decision 
to appoint William and Mary as the joint sovereigns in March 1689 that the Prince of 
Orange would gain legal legitimacy in the minds of the English people and be able to 
govern beyond his original capacity as a temporary, provisional authority.
In a similar way, throughout late 1774 and into 1775 and beyond, the Continental 
Congress had increasingly begun exercising a form of centralized governmental control. 
Through documents such as Declaration and Resolves o f  the First Continental Congress 
and later the Declaration o f  the Causes and Necessity o f  Taking Up Arms, both widely 
distributed and well received domestic propaganda, the convention began releasing 
formal, unified, and intercolonial statements of their rights and grievances.
The key to effectiveness of these propagandistic documents was the First 
Congress’ willingness to govern moderately and to attempt to take into account the 
interests of all of their representatives and thereby all of their constituents. This was done 
with respect to not only civil but also military matters. For instance, while Congress 
repudiated the authority of the British Parliament and stated their intention to levy their 
own taxes and represent themselves through their colonial assemblies and the national 
convention,96 they continued to hold out hope for reconciliation and in so doing refused 
to give into the demands of the more radical patriots. Thus through the use of relatively 
moderate and often conciliatory actions, Congress was able to increase its legitimacy in
96 Bonwick, 91.
the minds of moderate and conservative Americans in every colony.97 One of the key 
decisions in this phase of the conflict was the creation of the Continental Association, a 
“non-importation, non-consumption, and non-exportation agreement” among concerned 
citizens, which proved Congress’ willingness to not only regulate the colonial economy 
but to consider energetic yet nonviolent efforts to redress its grievances.98 Additionally, 
in the interest of ensuring that the problems faced by the colonies could be adequately 
dealt with beyond the end of the convention, the representatives were careful to ensure 
that a second Congress would convene, picking up where the first left off. The eventual 
return of all but six of the original delegates for the second session suggested an 
important continuity between the two conventions which further legitimized the actions 
of the representatives.99
Yet, when that Second Congress came together to continue their work seven 
months later they learned that many of their conciliatory measures had been met with 
scorn by the British Government which now considered the colonies to be in a de-facto 
state of rebellion. Faced with new and more serious challenges the Congress did not 
reverse any of its earlier decisions or give up its authority but instead chose to adopt a 
firmer stance with its opposition to the crown. This fact is evident in the increased 
emphasis that the continental delegates began to place on military matters early in the 
second convention; an emphasis which once again highlights the evolving nature of 
Congress’ central governmental authority.
In May, the Congress directed the Provincial Congress of New York to begin the 
process of defending Manhattan through the raising of a militia and the collection of




military supplies.100 The following month they agreed to assume command of the 
Massachusetts Army defending Boston, immediately and ostentatiously renaming it the 
Continental Army. To bolster this new national force, the delegates voted to raise more 
troops from Pennsylvania, Maryland and Virginia for use in the defense of New England. 
Additionally, the Congress authorized the use of military force to attempt to bring Canada 
into an alliance against Britain. And finally as the cost of these endeavors began to 
mount, the Congress authorized the printing of $2 million in paper money. All of these 
actions were announced via public declarations which reached a large percentage of the 
colonial population; a process which continued to cement Congress’ growing sense of 
authority.
Despite these changes, however, many elements of Congress’ strategy remained 
the same. Responding to the will of the colonial assemblies from each colony and their 
various constituents, the delegates still remained unwilling to give up on the chance of 
reconciliation and accept secession, stating that “we mean not to dissolve that union 
which has so long and so happily subsisted between us.”101 In fact the Congress insisted 
upon directly petitioning King George with the so-called “Olive Branch Petition,” in 
hope for a resolution and reunion of British and American interests. While the document 
may have angered many liberal members of Congress such as John Adams who believed 
it severely compromised the colonies’ political position, the petition once again signaled 
the fact that despite all of its grievances and the outbreak of open warfare in the colonies, 
the Congress was not prepared to act precipitously and would therefore only explore the 
concept of independence if the American people were supportive.
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However, by September, George had personally dismissed the reasoning of the 
Declaration o f the Causes and Necessity o f  Taking Up Arms, rejected the “Olive Branch 
Petition,” and on August 23, had formally declared the colonies to be in a state of
1 A-}
rebellion. Indeed, a series of royal proclamations and military actions would follow 
over the next six months, which would influence a majority of the colonists and their 
congressional representatives that independence was the only reasonable action left
1OTavailable for the colonies.
Public support for independence, while initially mixed continued to grow 
throughout late 1775 and early 1776, especially after the publishing of Thomas Paine’s 
monumental pamphlet Common Sense in January. Advocating independence and the 
ideals of English republicanism, the pamphlet is memorable for its inflammatory 
antimonarchical tone and the breadth of its effectiveness. Noted historian Gordon Wood 
has even gone so far as to label Paine’s work as “the most incendiary and popular 
pamphlet of the entire revolutionary era.”104
Driven by the sentiments expressed by Paine and other revolutionaries, 
constituents “at the local level” began instructing their congressional representatives to 
push for a formal declaration of separation from Great Britain.105 The effects of this 
movement were first felt at the state level as various colonies began to oust their loyally 
appointed governors and other officials, replacing all signs of formalized British control. 
At the national level the issue came to a head in June in the Congress as Richard Henry 
Lee, following the instructions of the Virginia Convention, introduced a resolution for the
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united colonies to declare their separation from Britain. As Lee’s proposal was being 
debated by the delegates, a special committee was created with the task of creating a 
document that would formally proclaim the independence and explain the reasons behind 
it, should the resolution be adopted.
This document, the American Declaration o f Independence written principally by 
Thomas Jefferson in June 1776 and adopted and issued the following month, is in many 
ways the culmination of the rhetoric of the initial phase of the American Revolution’s 
propaganda campaign. In principle it represents not only the will of the American people 
to obtain independence from the mother country but also their willingness to create a new 
government and place the Continental Congress in control of it, at least for the time 
being. One particular section of the declaration reinforces this fact. Having announced the 
reasons impelling it to separate from Great Britain and stating the basic rights and 
liberties of the American people, the document then states that “these United Colonies 
and of Right ought to be Free and Independent States.. .and that as Free and Independent 
States, they have full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish 
Commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things which Independent States may of right 
do ”106 This section in effect formally states that the Continental Congress has the right to 
behave as a national government and in principle justifies all of its previous 
governmental actions.
However, despite the success of documents such as Declaration o f Independence 
and Congress’ theoretical attainment of sovereignty and legitimacy, it would take the 
American revolutionaries many years before they would fully achieve all of their goals. 
The sweeping claims of the declaration could not change the fact that the Continental
106 The Declaration o f  Independence (July 4, 1776)
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Congress still did not represent a fully united country. Many loyalists refused to accept 
the legitimacy of the body well into the 1780’s choosing to view the entire American 
revolutionary movement as an unjust rebellion against King George and a deliberate 
seizure of power. Still others remained undecided or ambivalent towards the issues. Even 
those patriots who strongly supported the revolutionary cause would see their faith 
severely tested during the next decade. Nevertheless, the monumental steps taken by the 
congressmen to craft an effective propaganda campaign and use it to slowly adopt the 
powers of a centralized government that was accepted by many throughout the colonies 
and beyond is extremely instructive and provides us with a great deal of valuable 
information with which to compare this fascinating revolution to other similar 
movements. *
Conclusion
Before concluding I am compelled to note an important limitation of this study. 
This section has focused on how propaganda was used during two specific periods during 
these revolutions. With regard to the propaganda of the Glorious Revolution and the role 
played by William III and his supporters, it has roughly considered all of the 
propagandistic actions employed by the revolutionaries from autumn 1687 to spring 
1689. For the American Revolution, the chapter has focused on all the propaganda 
created and distributed by George Washington and the Continental Congress from the 
summer of 1774 to the summer of 1776. While the discussion of these events has 
provided a great deal of information about the initial steps taken by revolutionaries to
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attempt to legitimize themselves, it does not fully explain how the American or English 
revolutionaries fully attained legitimacy. The reason for this omission is twofold.
First, it is often difficult to determine when a revolution is complete and when 
“legitimacy” has been achieved. Though revolutionaries may declare their movements to 
be a success and may physically control the territory which they wish to govern, they 
may still face great resistance from inside and outside their borders. While William III 
may have been crowned king in April 1689, he still faced opposition from the inhabitants 
of Scotland and Ireland, many of whom considered the deposed James to be their rightful 
sovereign. Similarly, while the Continental Congress may have declared its independence 
from Great Britain in the summer of 1776, the English government would not recognize 
this independence until the Treaty of Paris in September 1783. Thus, at the very best, the 
coronation of King William III and Queen Mary II and the Declaration of American 
Independence represent only the theoretical attainment of actual political legitimacy. And 
while this legitimacy is indeed important when considered as part of the larger histories 
of both countries, its nature is limited and open to dispute.
Second, as I have stated before, because of the narrow scope of this modest essay 
it is far too ambitious and indeed unnecessary to attempt a complete discussion of the 
propaganda of both the Glorious and American Revolutions. Instead, for the purposes of 
my focused topic, I believe a discussion of the initial phases of each revolution’s 
propaganda war is far more practical and indeed quite instructive. For while both sets of 
revolutionaries did employ various intricate and constantly shifting propagandistic 
strategies over the course of their struggle, many of their fundamental early methods 
would continue throughout the conflict and would also greatly influence their later
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efforts. Thus, I believe this study of the key figures of the early moments of each 
revolution and their basic propagandistic strategies has revealed a great deal about the 
general nature of their larger propaganda campaigns.
As this section has shown, propaganda did indeed figure heavily in both the 
Glorious Revolution and the American Revolution as both of our groups of 
revolutionaries, despite various innate differences, used an assortment of sometimes 
strikingly similar means to successfully disseminate their revolutionary messages, 
resulting in the eventual legitimization of their revolutionary governments.
Perhaps the biggest differences between these revolutions are exposed when one 
attempts to compare the initial goals of the revolutionaries and their initial reasons for 
undertaking their revolts. The Glorious Revolution, from its inception, was always 
designed to be secured through military force. Its goal was to capture control of England, 
its territory and its government. The American Revolution, on the other hand, was 
undertaken with a certain degree of reluctance as a result of several failed attempts at 
reconciliation between the English government and its colonies. Military conflict was for 
a long period of time explicitly avoided while peaceful measures were employed to 
attempt to end the dispute.
Other disparities can be found when one examines the authority structures of the 
revolutions and their propaganda campaigns. The Glorious Revolution was William of 
Orange’s revolution and-it is a movement for which he undoubtedly, willingly, and 
candidly used propaganda. The American Revolution, conversely, was a far more 
decentralized affair and as a result General George Washington’s role in its propaganda 
was far different. Washington, unlike William, did not openly seek advancement as a
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leader of his revolution and was comparatively less involved in the development and the 
spread of its propaganda.
Yet, despite these contrasts, both leaders did at the very least attempt to deceive 
those around them and knowingly supported their movements’ propaganda campaigns. In 
so doing both served important and strikingly similar roles as propaganda symbols and 
symbolic figureheads of their revolts. In addition, to these similarities the larger bodies of 
government, which not only supported each leader but also crafted and distributed a great 
deal of the revolutionary propaganda themselves, acted in strikingly similar ways. Both 
the British Parliament and the American Continental Congress, in conjunction with 
Washington and William, had a huge hand in the spread of revolutionary propaganda 
through official declarations (many of which were printed as newspaper articles), 
pamphlets, letters, speeches and petitions.
Eventually this propaganda enabled Washington, William, the Congress and the 
Parliament to take on the roles normally reserved for a legal government, despite the fact 
that these revolutionaries in many ways lacked full legal legitimacy. This process 
increased their ability to validate themselves in the eyes of their people and ultimately 
enabled them to wield more authority in their revolutions.
Despite all these parallels, further differences can also be pulled from our study. 
For instance, William, with the help of dedicated allies such as Gilbert Burnet, used the 
pulpit of the Anglican Church to further extend his message and frame the conflict in 
religious terms. This explicitly religious element of the Glorious Revolution is absent 
from the American Revolution and while the American revolutionaries did indeed 
successfully use religious language as part of their propaganda and frequently espoused
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the belief that God was on their side, they did not make a concerted national effort to 
spread this message using American churches. While this dissimilarity may complicate a 
comparison of these movements I believe in general it simply reinforces the fact that at 
its core the Glorious Revolution was a far more religious conflict than the American 
Revolution. Furthermore, I believe these points suggest that the American conflict was 
motivated far more by political and philosophical issues rather than religious ones. In the 
end, I do not believe these conclusions are surprising given the fact that if one examines 
the initial goals and the rationale of these revolutionaries, William of Orange and his 
supporters consistently saw their revolution as a religiously motivated one, while the 
Continental Congress and George Washington always saw theirs as being far more 
political and ideological.
Considering the questions posed at the very beginning of this study, I believe this 
thesis has provided important information with regards to how propaganda is used in 
revolution and how legitimacy is attained. In general my paper suggests that the forms of 
propaganda which use religion, while also appealing to political and ideological 
principles have the best chance of success. This appears to be true even in very different 
types of revolutions which may be fought for religious or political reasons. While some 
may have a problem labeling all of the tactics I have discussed in this essay as 
“propaganda” I believe that we should adopt a more fluid understanding of the term so 
that readers are not immediately overwhelmed by its use and do not immediately equate 
the works of Stalin with those of someone like Washington. In the end I think we should 
become more comfortable with the concept of propaganda and accept its prevalence and 
its power, especially in our own time. Finally, I believe that while we may never know
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why some revolutions succeed and others do not, I believe we can all agree that a 
carefully orchestrated, well crafted, and diverse propaganda campaign is essential for any 
group of revolutionaries no matter when they fight or the purpose of their movement.
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IV. Epilogue: Propaganda and the Memory o f Revolution
Celebrated eighteenth-century English politician and philosopher Henry St John, 
the 1st Viscount Bolingbroke, once said that “history is philosophy teaching by
107examples.” This sentiment remains important even to today’s historians who strive to 
have their works be instructive, inspirational, and yet free from any damaging bias or 
subjectivity. Even today, however, as Jack Rakove has stated, “the ideal of ‘unbiased’
1 / \ Q
history remains an elusive goal.” This problem of objectivity has long plagued even the 
most evenhanded of scholars. Despite the utmost attention to detail and attempts at 
impartiality, all historians interject their own beliefs and personal preconceptions into 
every project they undertake. I have always been intrigued by the nature of this problem 
and its connections to our accounts of various revolutions and revolutionary propaganda.
After all, the historians of Lord Bolingbroke’s era were much less concerned with 
objectivity. Older histories were written in order to advance beliefs which the historian, 
or others with influence around them, believed were most important. Bias was accepted 
and even encouraged, especially with regards to the history’s more significant figures. 
William Gordon, a noted eighteenth-century American historian, believed that it was his 
responsibility to “oblige all, who have performed any distinguished part on the theatre of 
the world, to appear before us in their proper character; and to render an account at the 
tribunal of posterity, as models which ought to be followed or as examples to be censured
107 Issac Kramnick, ed., Lord Bolingbroke: Historical Writings, (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 
1973), xvi; this quotation is also attributed to Thucydides in his The History o f the Peloponnesian War in 
various sources.
108 Jack Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making o f  the Constitution (New York: A. A. 
Knopf, 1996), 6.
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or avoided.”109 It is no surprise therefore that the histories of the famous leaders of the
Glorious Revolution and the American Revolution were stunted according to the interests
of the historians of their time. In fact, even one hundred or two hundred years after the
events which made them famous, an objective account of King William and George
Washington was still not even being attempted.
While most descriptions of the Prince of Orange’s landing at Torbay attest to the
grand scale of the enterprise and the general importance of the event, perhaps no account
captures the scene with as much vivid imagery, beautiful prose, and unabashed
partisanship as Thomas Babington Macaulay’s massive, multi-volume The History o f
England from the Accession o f  James II, originally published in 1840. The author relates
the story of the landing with a truly dramatic flair. After a dreary mist had initially
prevented the fleet from coming ashore, Macaulay states that suddenly “a soft breeze
sprang up from the south,” allowing the sun to break through and light the way for the
prince’s arrival.110 Coming ashore uncontested William and his entourage immediately
mounted their horses and began to review the countryside. Nearby, peasants were said to
marvel at the sight and immediately flocked to the prince’s banner since all “held Popery
in detestation.”111 The prince himself was said to be in high spirits and extremely hopeful
for the rest of the expedition. Marching through the nearby town of Exeter four days later
he was met by a huge crowd of supporters who, having never seen a sight such as this
112before, came “half a day’s journey to meet the champion of their religion.” Overcome
109 William Gordon, The History o f  the Rise, Progress and Establishment o f  the Independence o f the United 
States, (London, 1788), i.





with “delight and awe,” spectators crowded into every door, window balcony and roof 
and “gaily decorated” their houses.113 On the prince’s banners, according to Macaulay, 
the words “The Liberties of England and the Protestant religion I will maintain,” were 
prominently printed.114
Considering the good fortune with which they had proceeded on their journey 
many members of the expedition were thoroughly convinced that “the ordinary laws of 
nature” had been “suspended for the preservation of the liberty and religion of 
England.”115 The weather had cooperated at every turn, helping the Dutch fleet reach the 
shore while frustrating the pursuit of the prince’s enemies. This reminded many of the 
men of the destruction of the Spanish Armada a hundred years before. In addition, the 
fact that the landing had taken place on the anniversary of the failure of “the blackest plot 
ever devised by papists,” The Gunpowder Plot, only added to the increased feeling of 
confidence among the troops.116 Throughout the ranks there was an understanding that 
what was transpiring was a special event that would usher in a new period of greatness 
for the English nation.
Only a few years later a no more objective account of General George 
Washington’s arrival in Cambridge, Massachusetts would be presented by one of 
America’s first great authors and historians: Washington Irving. In his The Life o f  George 
Washington, originally published in 1855, Irving paints his subject’s life in vivid detail. 
According to the writer, the General’s procession into the town was full of pomp and 






and the thundering of the artillery gave note to the enemy beleaguered in Boston of his 
arrival.”117 The General’s appearance was “calculated to captivate the public eye,” and he 
was “the admiration of the soldiery and of a throng collected from the surrounding 
countryside.”118 In the midst of all of this revelry Washington, it is said, remained 
“modest at all times.”119 “The honors with which he was received, the acclamations of the 
public, the cheerings of the army, only told him how much was expected of him.”120
The following morning Washington took formal command of the army and began 
by reviewing his troops and their lines on horseback, slowly beginning the task of turning 
his inexperienced yet faithful army into a capable fighting force. When faced with such a 
challenge the General is said to have acted with “that solemn resolution and that hopeful
191reliance on Supreme Goodness which belonged to his magnanimous nature.” Other 
subsequent accounts and works of art continue to embellish the scene, picturing 
Washington saluting his troops on horseback before taking cover under an elm tree. The 
tree for years afterwards would affectionately be known as the “Washington Elm” and 
would be marked by a plaque which can still be found there today.
The rampant inaccuracies of both accounts expose not only the bias of the 
histories of the past and the general challenge to the historian but also the enduring power 
of the propaganda of revolution. In reality, Washington’s entrance into Cambridge was
199anything but a glorious scene. The general and his entourage arrived in the town on a 
wet and dreary afternoon. There were no crowds of soldiers there to greet the group, no




122 Fred W. Anderson, “The Hinge o f Revolution: George Washington Confronts a People’s Army, July 3,
1775,” Massachusetts Historical Review, vol. 1 (1999): 21-48, 22.
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shouts of joy, and no cannons firing.123 In fact the only individuals actually there to 
witness his entrance were some idlers wandering through the town, most likely from the 
nearby college of Harvard. While a contingent of troops had initially planned on greeting 
Washington, the time of his arrival was not definitively known and thus when the men 
assembled a day earlier and were frustrated to find that the General had not yet arrived, 
they did not return the next day for fear of a similar disappointment.124 When they did 
finally meet their new commander many of the troops were apparently unimpressed with 
him.125
Similarly, William’s landing and the beginning of his march, while it must have
\
been an impressive scene, could not have been as momentous an occasion as the 
description given by Macaulay would have us believe. As later historians are quick to 
point out, such fanciful accounts are careful to leave out “the drizzling, chilly rain, the 
mud, the steep hills, and the narrow, rocky roads that were little better than footpaths; or 
the grim undercurrent of fear that gripped a people caught between a powerful invading 
army and the orders of their King that any communication or commerce with it were 
treason or death.”126
While Washington and William may very well appear before us here in their 
“proper” character, serving as models for countless others to emulate, as our study has 
shown, their true nature was far more complicated and decidedly not as “glorious” as 
they would have us see. Thus, I bel ieve we must never forget that history itself has served
Freeman, 477.
124 Ibid.
125 Lengel, General George Washington: A Military Life, 106.
126 Lucile Pinkham, William 111 and the Respectable Revolution: The Part Played by William o f  Orange in 
the Revolution o f 1688 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), 152.
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as a form of propaganda, with historians picking up where the revolutionary 
propagandists left off.
If one desires further proof of this they need only consider the ideological origins 
of the American Revolution and its links to the popular Whig interpretation of the 
Glorious Revolution. Thanks to the efforts of historians such as Macaulay the Glorious 
Revolution, and in particular the English Bill of Rights of 1689, was viewed as “a 
formative stage in the development of liberal democracy.”127 By linking the revolution 
with the works of John Locke and in particular his Two Treatises o f  Government which 
was first published in the aftermath of the movement, historians credited King William 
III and his Parliament for having “nurtured the growth of freedom and liberty among the
n o
English people.” In reality, however, Locke’s work was not a product of the revolution 
and exerted little to no influence over it, a fact which is not too surprising when one 
considers the reasons for William’s invasion of England and his rationale for claiming the 
throne. In fact, William himself, following the issuance of the Declaration o f Rights 
denied any formal connection between his acceptance of the throne and his acceptance of 
the terms of the bill.129
Nevertheless, despite these false links, the American revolutionary generation 
looked to the Bill of Rights of 1689 and indeed the Glorious Revolution itself as a 
formative event and adapted its language for their fight against King George. George 








Rights while elements the American Constitution of 1789 can also be said to resemble the 
1689 document.130
All of these facts I believe only reinforce the power of the propaganda of the 
Glorious Revolution and American Revolution, propaganda which this thesis has 
attempted to compare and discuss in detail. No matter the academic application of this 
modest essay I nevertheless believe the information presented in it demonstrates the 
power of revolutionary persuasion. These revolutionaries not only influenced their own 
populations and used their arguments to attain legitimacy for their governments, they 
influenced countless generations after them and no doubt created arguments that allowed 
future revolutionaries to successfully revolt. If we take one thing away from this study, it 
should be that the Glorious Revolution and the American Revolution were successful 
because of their propaganda; propaganda which had a profound effect upon subsequent 
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